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  1I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The rise of the New Keynesian or forward-looking model as the workhorse model to ana-
lyze monetary policy issues has generated renewed interest in the delegation issue. The need to 
vest a central banker with the authority to conduct monetary policy by discretion arises because 
society cannot tie the hands of the policymaker. Optimal pre-commitment is not possible. Poli-
cymaking by discretion is the only viable alternative. However, as pointed out by Woodford 
(1999), pure discretion turns out to be an inferior strategy as it does not introduce inertia into the 
conduct of monetary policy or provide a mechanism to influence forward-looking expectations. 
If the policymaker uses discretion in minimizing society’s loss function, he counters a one-off 
positive cost-push shock by raising the interest rate to produce a negative output gap which in 
turn causes inflation to fall. Optimal policy by discretion does not directly affect the forward-
looking expectations of inflation and causes the endogenous variables to adjust within the current 
period. In addition, the conduct of policy by discretion produces a stabilization bias, i.e. insuffi-
cient adjustment in the output gap relative to policy from a timeless perspective. 
Society can introduce desirable inertia into the conduct of monetary policy and make the 
formation of forward-looking expectations of inflation susceptible to current policy action by 
delegating a specific loss function to a central banker, who acts with discretion. This delegated 
loss function is different from society’s in that it features a different target variable. Thus, society 
instructs the policymaker to pursue an objective that does not appear in its own welfare function. 
Vestin (2000), Jensen (2002), and Walsh (2003) examine such delegated loss functions in the 
pure forward-looking model or in an extended version of it. Discretionary price-level targeting, 
nominal income growth targeting, or a speed limit policy introduces a lagged endogenous vari-
able into the model. This has the effect of rendering policymaking inertial and making forward-
looking expectations react to current policy in a way similar to policy from a timeless perspec-
tive. This channel through which the expectations of the public can be affected is of critical im-
portance in the conduct of optimal discretionary policy. In the face of a positive cost-push shock, 
the policymaker can reduce both the rate of inflation and expected future inflation simultane-
ously. Reductions in the latter are achieved through keeping the output gap negative for a pro-
longed period of time.
1 
This paper analyzes the merits of discretionary price-level targeting and a discretionary 
speed limit policy in the pure forward-looking model. Our analysis focuses on the case where 
policy is determined by a myopic policymaker. A myopic policymaker treats the current expecta-
  2tion of the price level or inflation next period as constant when setting policy. Treating the ex-
pectation as constant has the effect of suppressing the link that exists between current policy ac-
tion and the forward-looking expectations. Such myopic behavior on the part of the policymaker 
turns out to be of central importance in a setting where society delegates the conduct of monetary 
policy to a central banker who acts with discretion. The analytical results indicate that when the 
forward-looking expectations are treated as constant when policy is being set, then both discre-
tionary price-level targeting and a discretionary speed limit policy can replicate the behavior of 
the output gap and the rate of inflation that eventuate under policy from a timeless perspective. 
The time series property of the cost-push shock has no bearing on this result. Specifically, soci-
ety must delegate a price level target to a central banker who has greater aversion to price level 
variability than society has to inflation variability. In the alternative scenario of a speed limit pol-
icy, society must appoint a central banker who has a greater aversion to inflation variability than 
society. Both outcomes are interpreted as warranting the appointment of a conservative central 
banker. 
The results reported in this paper differ markedly from those of Vestin (2000) and Walsh 
(2003). Vestin concludes that discretionary price level targeting can replicate the behavior of the 
output gap and inflation under policy from a timeless perspective only if the cost-push shock is a 
white noise process. He also reports that there is no clear-cut answer to the delegation issue un-
der discretionary price level targeting. Walsh finds that a discretionary speed limit policy is al-
ways inferior to optimal policy from a timeless perspective, irrespective of the type of central 
banker appointed. The difference in results is attributable to the way the policymaker treats the 
forward-looking expectations at the policy-setting stage. Both Vestin and Walsh assume that the 
policymaker does not take the forward-looking expectations as given. Rather, the policymaker 
views the forward-looking expectations of the target variables as dynamic processes that respond 
to current policy action.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a simple variant 
of the forward-looking model and discusses optimal monetary policy from a timeless perspec-
tive. This form of optimal policy serves as the benchmark case against which discretionary price 
level targeting and a discretionary speed limit policy are compared. Section III analyzes price-
level targeting under discretion while Section IV elaborates on a speed limit policy under discre-
tion. The delegation issue under constant expectations is taken up in Section V. Section VI con-
cludes. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Average inflation targeting  (Nessén and Vestin (2005)) is another policy strategy that affects the formation of 
forward-looking expectations and introduces inertia into the conduct of policy.  
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 II. THE MODEL AND OPTIMAL POLICY FROM A TIMELESS PERSPECTIVE 
 The Forward-Looking Model 
The simple forward-looking model consists of the following two equations: 
tt t 1 1 t t y Ey ar v + =− +      1)   
      t t 1 t t t u ay E + + = + π β π      2) 
 
  where   
yt is the output gap 
  rt is the real rate of interest and 
  πt is the rate of inflation. 
 
ut and vt are autoregressive disturbances:  tt 1 ˆ vvv t γ − = +   01 γ ≤ <  
     tt 1 ˆ uu t u ρ − = +    01 ρ ≤ <  
Both a and a1 are strictly positive parameters. β  is the discount factor. 
Equation 1) is the forward-looking IS curve. The current output gap depends on the cur-
rent expectation of the output gap next period and is inversely related to the real rate of interest 
which serves as the policy instrument. Equation 1) assumes that the policymaker has full control 
over the setting of the real rate of interest.
2 Equation 2) represents the forward-looking Phillips 
Curve. The current rate of inflation depends on expected inflation next period and the current 
output gap.  
 
Policy Objectives and Optimal Policy from a Timeless Perspective 
Society is concerned about the variability of the rate of inflation and the output gap. So-
ciety’s objectives appear in an intertemporal loss function that the policymaker strives to mini-
mize at a given point in time. The policy objective takes the following form: 
y ,
Min
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2 Suppressing the distinction between the nominal and real interest rate simplifies the algebraic analysis. Making this 
simplifying assumption has no material bearing on the results. Indeed, full control over the real rate of interest is 
necessary to implement a given policy successfully – be it under commitment or discretion.  
  4The target variables are the rate of inflation and the output gap. The respective target 
value for the output gap and the rate of inflation is zero. The policymaker minimizes the above 
loss function with respect to the target variables subject to the constraint imposed by the Phillips 
Curve: 
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 Hence the Lagrangean for the policy problem becomes:
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Taking the derivative of  with respect to the target variables ( 1 Γ 3 3 2 2 1 1 , y , , y , , y π π π ,…) yields the 
following first-order conditions under commitment: 
 
0 a y 2 t t = +λ             for periods  ....... 3 , 2 , 1 t =  6a) 
 
   0 2 t 1 t t = − + − λ λ μπ  for  periods  ....... 3 , 2 t =  6b) 
   
   0 2 1 1 = −λ μπ  for  period  1   6c) 
 
In 6a)-6c)  1. β =
3 What is remarkable about the first-order conditions is that the policy-
maker follows two different decision rules for setting the rate of inflation. In the initial, i.e. start-
up period, he uses equation 6c) while for all subsequent periods he uses 6b) to set the rate of in-
flation. Inspection of 6b) and 6c) reveals that the optimizing condition for inflation in the initial 
period does not take account of expectations regarding future inflation while the optimizing con-
dition in later periods does. Setting the rate of inflation according to 6c) is clearly suboptimal in 
the forward-looking model as current private sector expectations of inflation can be influenced 
by monetary policy. In sharp contrast, the policymaker employs 6a) in every period to set the 
output gap.    
                                                 
3 Making this assumption allows for a straightforward interpretation of the intertemporal loss function in terms of 
the unconditional expectation of the loss function as explained at the end of the current section. 
  5The existence of two distinctly different decision rules that governs the behavior of the 
rate of inflation gives rise to the time-inconsistency problem in the conduct of optimal monetary 
policy as aptly described by McCallum and Nelson (2004).  
Policy from a timeless perspective circumvents the time-inconsistency problem. The 
timeless perspective assumes a stable macroeconomic environment where price stability has 
been achieved and inflationary expectations are well-anchored. The conduct of monetary policy 
is transparent, stable, and well-understood by the public. As a result, the condition that character-
ized the behavior of the rate of inflation in the initial period can be ignored.
4  
For periods t=2, 3, … combining equations 6a) and 6b) yields: 
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Equation 7) represents the systematic linear relationship between inflation and the 
change in the output gap that characterizes the conduct of optimal monetary policy from a time-
less perspective. The presence of the lagged output gap in the policy rule affords the policymaker 
to condition private sector expectations. It also makes current policy depend on the past behavior 
of the output gap. An important property of optimal monetary policy under policy from a time-
less perspective is that the weight on the change in the output gap in the policy rule does not de-
pend on the degree of persistence in the cost-push shock. The history dependence of monetary 
policy is thus not due to the nature of the cost-push shock but to the inherent inertial character of 
optimal policy. 
To determine the behavior of the output gap and the rate of inflation under optimal policy 
from a timeless perspective, we combine the building blocks of the forward-looking model with 
the policy rule governing optimal policy. Substitute the Phillips Curve and the IS relation into 
equation 7) and solve the resulting expression for rt.
5 This expression is then substituted back 
into the IS relation to obtain: 
                                                 
4 See Woodford (1999) for an elegant description of the conditions necessary to implement monetary policy from a 
timeless perspective.  
5 For the sake of brevity, the policymaker’s reaction function is not reported. 
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Combining equation 8) with equation 7) yields the reduced form equation for the rate of infla-
tion: 














π    9) 
 
The expectation of the rate of inflation in period t+1 is determined by applying the mini-
mum state variable approach suggested by McCallum (1983). Due to the inertial character of op-
timal policy from the timeless perspective, the lagged output gap appears in the putative solution 
for the endogenous variables of the model:  
  1 t 12 t 11 t y u y − + = φ φ      10) 
  1 t 22 t 21 t y u − + = φ φ π      11)   
 
After applying the method of undetermined coefficients, we obtain the following solu-
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Before proceeding, a word on the measurement of performance of a given policy strategy 
under certainty equivalence is in order. A natural measure of the variability of a target variable 
(around its mean) is its unconditional variance. Straightforward manipulation, which requires 
multiplying the intertemporal loss function  by 1 β −  and taking the limit as β  approaches unity 
                                                 
6McCallum and Nelson (2004) adopt a similar solution procedure. Their algebraic analysis considers, however, only 
white noise disturbances. 
  7turns the intertemporal loss function, which is expressed in terms of expected squared deviations 
of the target variables (around their target values) at t=t0 , into a linear combination of the un-
conditional variances of the target variables. More formally, 
   .   14)  ]
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Evaluating this expression leads to a simple metric which consists of the weighted sum of the 
unconditional variances of the output gap and the rate of inflation:
7 
   () () () tt EL Vy V μ π = +    15) 
Equation 15) is the performance measure of policy from society’s point of view. To calculate 
expected losses under policy from a timeless perspective, we need to determine the variances of 
the output gap and the rate of inflation associated with equations 12) and 13). Both variances ap-
pear in the table below.  
 
Table 1: The Variances of the Output Gap and the Rate of Inflation: The Timeless Perspective 
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Optimal policy from a timeless perspective is the benchmark case and forms the basis of 
the comparison with flexible price level targeting under discretion in Section III and a speed 
limit policy under discretion in Section IV. 
 
III. FLEXIBLE PRICE LEVEL TARGETING UNDER DISCRETION 
This section analyzes the case of discretionary flexible price level targeting. Society dele-
gates a price level target to a myopic central banker who acts with discretion in the conduct of 
policy. 
 
7Chapter 7 of Froyen and Guender (2007) provides further details on the individual steps of this transformation.  
  8Under flexible price level targeting, the target variables are the price level and the output 
gap. The target for the price level is assumed constant through time, and the target for the level 
of real output is its potential level The expected loss function that the policymaker minimizes 
consists of the variance of the output gap and the variance of the price level  : ) p ( t
8  
   ) p ( V ˆ ) y ( V ] L [ E t t t μ + =      16) 
    
μ ˆ indicates the extent to which the policymaker cares about the variability of the price level rela-
tive to the variability of the output gap. 
In the current period, the policymaker decides on the systematic relationship between the 
target variables, the output gap and the price level. The parameter θ ˆ  represents the weight the 
policymaker attaches to the output gap relative to the deviation of the observed price level from 
its target level  in the policy rule.
* p
9  
0 p p y ˆ *
t t = − + θ      17) 
 
To solve the model, we begin by rewriting equation 2) in terms of the price level and set-
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Next, substitute equation 18) and equation 1) into the policy rule, equation 17), and solve for the 
policy instrument :  t r
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Equation 19) represents the reaction function of the policymaker. The setting of the instrument 
responds to the demand-side and the cost-push disturbances, the expected output gap next period, 
                                                 
8 The same transformation as in the previous section is applied to the intertemporal loss function which now in-
cludes the price level as one of the two target variables.   
9 The linear relationship between the price level and the output gap in equation 17) can be formally derived by tak-
ing an intertemporal perspective. See Guender (2006) for further details. Intuitively, the existence of a quadratic loss 
function gives rise to a linear policy rule.  
10 Initially, we consider the case where the cost-push shock is a white noise disturbance. The case of persistence in 
the cost-push shock is taken up later.  
  9and the deviations of the lagged price level and the expected price level next period from the 
price level target.  
To get the reduced form equation for real output, insert equation 19) into the IS relation: 
a ˆ 2
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To recover the reduced form equation for the price level, combine equation 20) with the 
policy rule, equation 17): 
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Under discretion, the policymaker acts myopically and takes the expectation of the price 
level next period as given. In setting policy, the policymaker thus ignores a dynamic aspect of 
the expectations formation process, the connection between  1 tt Ep +  and t p that exists under price 
level targeting. More specifically, treating the expectation of the price level next period as a con-
stant suppresses the effect of a change in the setting of the policy instrument, which affects the 
current price level contemporaneously, on the expected price level next period. With  1 tt Ep + being 
treated as constant in equations 20) and 21), the variances of the output gap and the price level 
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The policymaker’s objective can then be stated as: 
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Recall that the policymaker takes the current expectation of the price level next period as given 
when determining the optimal value of the policy parameter. The actual behavior of the endoge-
nous variables pt and yt is, however, influenced by  as shown by equations 20) and 21). 
Hence it is necessary to show how the expectation is formed. Let the putative solution for   be 
given by:  
1 t t p E +
t p
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Inserting the above expressions for the price level and for the expectation of the price 
level into equation 21) and matching coefficients yields the following reduced form equation for 
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In the limit, the size of the coefficient on the lagged price level is bounded from below by zero 
and bounded from above by 1.    
In short, as  . p p , 0 ˆ 2 a
ˆ 2
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Thus the price level exhibits persistence for  . ˆ 0 ∞ < < μ  
                                                 
11 The positive square root is appropriate as it implies  as  ˆ θ →∞ 0 μ → and  as ˆ 0 θ → μ →∞. 
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Under a strict price level targeting scheme,    . p p , 0 ˆ , ˆ 1 t
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For the opposite extreme we have:    . u , ˆ , 0 ˆ t t → ∞ → → π θ μ
For the output gap the reduced form equation is: 
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Again applying the procedure laid out in the appendix yields the variances of the price 
level and the output gap under flexible price level targeting: 
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As a final step, we derive the variance of the rate of inflation under the flexible price 
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Table 2 provides summary information about the behavior of inflation and the output gap under a 
flexible price-level target for the case of autocorrelated cost-push shocks. 
 
 
                                                 
12 See the appendix for further details on how this variance is calculated.  
  12Table 2: Flexible Price-Level Targeting under Discretion: Persistence in the Cost-Push Distur-
bance. 
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IV. A DISCRETIONARY SPEED LIMIT POLICY 
In a recent contribution, Walsh (2003) puts forth the argument that the Federal Reserve 
has in practice pursued a speed limit policy. He arrives at this conclusion after examining state-
ments made by members of the Board of Governors and studying press releases from the Federal 
Open Market Committee.
13 The distinguishing characteristic of a speed limit policy is that it fo-
cuses on the change in the output gap rather than the output gap proper. Naturally, the rate of 
inflation also remains a policy objective. 
Under the speed limit policy the policymaker’s objective is to minimize the expected loss 
function that consists of the weighted sum of the variance of the change in the output gap and the 
rate of inflation: 
 
) ( V ) y y ( V ] L [ E t
SL
1 t t t π μ + − = −    33) 
 
 V(▪) = the variance of the respective variable. 
=
SL μ policymaker’s aversion to inflation variability relative to output growth vari-
ability.   0
SL ≥ μ
                                                 
13 The term “speed limit” appears in a speech made by Governor Edward Gramlich in 1999:    
Solving a standard model of the macroeconomy, such a policy would effectively convert monetary policy into what 
might be called “speed limit” form, where policy tries to ensure that aggregate demand grows at roughly the ex-
pected rate of increase of aggregate supply, which increase can be more easily predicted….(Remarks, Wharton 
Public Policy Forum Series, Philadelphia, 1999 and reported by Walsh (2003)) 
  13 
 
The speed limit policy is set by an optimizing policymaker who acts with discretion. This 
policy involves choosing , the weight on the change in the output gap, so that the objective 
function is minimized. We label this systematic relationship the speed limit policy rule. The rule 
appears in equation 34) below.          
       34) 
SL θ
0 ) y y ( t 1 t t
SL = + − − π θ
 
To determine the behavior of the output gap and the rate of inflation under the speed limit 
policy, we combine the building blocks of the forward-looking model with the above policy rule. 
Substitute the Phillips Curve and the IS relation into equation 34) and solve the resulting expres-
sion for rt. This expression is then substituted back into the IS relation to obtain: 
















Combining equation 35) with equation 34) yields the reduced form equation for the rate of infla-
tion: 
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Just like policy from the timeless perspective and a price-level targeting strategy, the 
speed limit policy causes the current output gap and the current rate of inflation to depend on the 
past.  
On the assumption that the current expectation of inflation next period is constant, the 
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Substituting equations 37) and 38) into the policymaker’s objective function, equation 33), and 
carrying out the minimization exercise yields the optimal policy parameter under the speed limit 
policy:
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To calculate the expectation of the rate of inflation in period t+1 that appears in equations 
35) and 36), we apply again the minimum state variable approach. As the policy rule is based on 
the growth rate of the output gap, the putative solutions for the two endogenous variables contain 
the lagged output gap: 
1 t 12 t 11 t y u y − + = φ φ      40) 
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 Under the speed limit policy, the solutions for the output gap and the rate of inflation 
are: 
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Before proceeding, we have to comment on the choice of roots for   and 
SL θ 22 φ . In both cases, 
the positive root is the relevant root as it ensures that  as   and   as 








SL μ φ as   and that  0
SL → θ ∞ → 22 φ as 
.  ∞ →
SL θ
The variances of the output gap and the rate of inflation under the speed limit policy ap-
pear in the table below.  
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Table 3: The Variances of the Output Gap and the Rate of Inflation under a Speed Limit Policy 
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V. THE DELEGATION ISSUE UNDER CONSTANT EXPECTATIONS 
In this section we explore the delegation issue. The basic problem that society is con-
fronted with can be briefly described as follows. Suppose society’s loss function conforms to the 
standard loss function that includes the variances of the rate of inflation and the output gap. Sup-
pose further that it is not possible to commit the policymaker, a central banker, to conduct policy 
from a timeless perspective. The central banker thus conducts monetary policy by discretion.  
The objective of society is to achieve the outcomes for the rate of inflation and the output 
gap that obtain under optimal monetary policy from a timeless perspective. Is there a way for 
society to induce the policymaker to carry out policy in such a way so that the outcomes for the 
rate of inflation and real output correspond exactly to those under policy from a timeless per-
spective? In the remainder of this section, we show that society can realize this objective by dele-
gating a price level target to the central banker or by instructing him to follow a speed limit pol-
icy. Critical in this respect is that society appoints a central banker with desirable preferences. 
Under price level targeting the central banker must have the appropriate degree of aversion to 
price level variability. Under a speed limit policy it is essential to find a central banker who puts 
the correct weight on the variance of the rate of inflation in the expected loss function that con-
tains the variance of the change in the output gap as an argument.  
Consider the policy rules associated with policy from a timeless perspective, price level 
targeting, and the speed limit policy, respectively:  
  160 ) y y ( t 1 t t = + − − π θ  (Timeless  Perspective)  7) 
0 p p y ˆ *
t t = − + θ  (Price  level  target)  17) 
1 ()
SL
tt t yy θ − −+ = 0 π   (Speed limit policy)  34) 
Here we see immediately that the only difference between the policy rule that governs the speed 
limit policy and policy from a timeless perspective concerns the size of the weight on the change 
in the output gap. After taking first differences of the policy rule associated with the price level 
target, we obtain: 
 
0 ) y y ( ˆ
t 1 t t = + − − π θ    44) 
 
Again, the only difference between the dynamic form of the policy rule under a price 
level target and the rule under policy from a timeless perspective concerns the weight the poli-
cymaker attaches to the change in the output gap.
14 In Section III we established the optimal θ ˆ  
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Under optimal policy from a timeless perspective the optimal policy parameter obeys the follow-
ing relationship. 
 




θ =      45) 
 
Next we set the optimal θ ˆ  associated with discretionary policymaking and a price level target 
equal to the optimal θ  associated with policymaking from a timeless perspective and an inflation 
target.  
 
                                                 
14 The policy rule under average inflation targeting cannot be reconciled with the policy rule that underlies policy 







+ =  represent the policy rule for two-period average inflation 




ˆ ) a 4 ( ) ˆ a 3 ( ˆ a 3






Solving for μ ˆ yields 
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As  >   it follows that  μ
2 a 2 3+ μ
2 a 2+ μ ˆ >μ . Society must appoint a more conservative 
central banker and delegate to him a price level target to ensure that the behavior of inflation and 
the output gap under discretion mimics the behavior of inflation and the output gap from a time-
less perspective. This central banker is more conservative in the sense that his aversion to price 
level variability exceeds society’s aversion to inflation variability.
15   
Under a speed limit policy, the policymaker can also set policy so as to mimic the behav-
ior of the output gap and the rate of inflation that occurs under optimal policy from a timeless 
perspective. All that is required for society is to find the policymaker who has the requisite aver-
sion to inflation variability. To determine the appropriate degree of aversion, we first set 
equal to
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Solving for  yields: 
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+ =  which is not consistent with the rule under policy from a 
timeless perspective or the rule governing price level targeting. Hence the delegation issue becomes moot.  





 so that the two relative weights can be directly compared. The 
scale factor can be obtained by dividing equation 30) by equation 32). Doing so yields







. For three 
different parameter values (a=0.05, 0.25, 0.33; 01 0 μ < < ) the scaled relative weight in the policymaker’s loss 
function exceeds the relative weight in society’s loss function: 








, thus warranting the appoint-
ment of  a conservative central banker.  
  18Comparing the numerator with the denominator, we observe that  >   which in 
turn implies that .
μ
2 a 3 4 + μ
2 a 2 3+
μ μ >
SL 16 
Comparing the three weights, we find . This finding confirms that much like 
price level targeting a speed limit policy also requires a conservative central banker to ensure 
that both the rate of inflation and the output gap mimic their behavior under optimal policy from 
a timeless perspective. However, in comparison, a speed limit policy requires a less conservative 
central banker than a price-level targeting strategy as   Figure 1 illustrates the relation-
ship between 
μ μ μ ˆ
SL < <
SL μ < . ˆ μ




VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored an issue that arises in the delegation process. The main concern 
of the paper is with the way the policymaker handles the forward-looking expectations of private 
agents. The treatment of these expectations in the policy setting stage turns out to be of critical 
importance for the attainment of society’s basic objectives and for the type of central banker so-
ciety wants to appoint. The paper shows that if expectations are treated as constant, then a con-
servative central banker can replicate the behavior of output and inflation under policy from a 
timeless perspective by engaging in price-level targeting or following a speed limit policy. 
This result does not carry over to the case where the policymaker treats expectations as a 
dynamic process and takes account of the effect of changes in policy on expectations. In such a 
setting, a speed limit policy (Walsh, (2003)) cannot replicate the behavior of output and inflation 
produced by optimal policy at all while price level targeting (Vestin, (2000)) can do so only for 
white noise disturbances. Vestin’s analysis suggests further that under price-level targeting the 
central banker is about as conservative as under inflation targeting.  
  
                                                 
16 Again, the relative weight in the policymaker’s loss function ought to be multiplied by a scale factor. Under a 
speed limit policy the scale factor is  
t
SL SL
tt 1 2 2
V(y ) 11
;
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. The choice of a conservative 







> . This condition is satisfied by three different values of the key parameter 
a (a=0.05, 0.25, 0.33; 01 0 μ << ). Vestin (2000) and Walsh (2003) apply scale factors as well.  
17 As both discretionary price level targeting and the discretionary speed limit policy achieve the optimal outcome 
for the rate of inflation and the output gap under policy from a timeless perspective, both policies generate a better 
trade-off between output and inflation variability than inflation targeting under discretion.  
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  To obtain the actual variance of the rate of the price level and the output gap, 
respectively, we proceed in the following way. Our point of departure is Equation 27) and 













































































     
 
Rewrite the above in vector form: 
 
Xt      =          BXt-1                          +  CUt 
 
Forming the variance-covariance matrix yields 
 
E[XtXt









Φ  =        BΦB
’         +      CΩC’ 
 
Next, vectorizing by stacking columns yields  
 
Φ
v  =      (BΦB




v  =        (B⊗B) Φ




v  =    (I  -    B⊗B)
-1 (C⊗C)Ω
v  (A1) 
 
where  
Φ is the variance-covariance matrix of Xt 
Ω is the variance-covariance matrix of Ut.  
 
The construction of B⊗B proceeds as follows. Define B as  
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is a 4x4 matrix 
 
It follows then that  
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The model assumes that the cost-push disturbance follows a white noise process:  . 
2
u t ) u ( V σ =
 
After taking the inverse of (I  -   B⊗B), we can employ Equation (A1) obtain the variances of 
real output and the price level. They take the following form: 
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Calculating the variance of inflation and letting  yields: 
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=  (A4) 
  
 
Substituting the variance of the price level from Equation (A2) into (A4) and manipulating the 
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